Click for full-sized scanned image
Click for full-sized scanned image
Click for full-sized scanned image
Click for full-sized scanned image
Union Correspondence, etc.
Statement of Messrs. Miles and Keitt of what transpired between the President and the South Carolina delegation.
In compliance with the request of the Convention, we beg leave to make the following statement:
On Saturday, the 8th of December several of the South Carolina delegation, including ourselves, waited upon the President. At this time there was a growing belief that re-enforcements were on the eve of being sent to the forts in Charleston Harbor.
It was known that the subject was frequently and earnestly discussed in the Cabinet. It was rumored that General Cass and Mr. Holt were urgent that re-enforcements should be sent. Upon our being announced the President, who was then in Cabinet council, came out to us in the anteroom. We at once entered into a conversation upon the topic which was so closely occupying his thoughts as well as ours. The President seemed much disturbed and moved. He told us that he had a painful interview with the wife of Major Anderson, who had come on from New York to see him. She had manifested great anxiety and distress at the situation of her husband, whom she seemed to consider in momentary danger of an attack from an excited and lawless mob. The President professed to feel a deep responsibility resting upon him to protect the lives of Major Anderson and his command. We told him that the news that re-enforcements were on their way to Charleston would be the surest means of provoking what Mrs. Anderson apprehended, and what he so much depredated. We said further that we did not believe that Major Anderson was in any danger of such an attack; that the general sentiment of the State was against any such proceeding; that prior to the action of the State Convention, then only ten days off, we felt satisfied that there would be no attempt to molest the forts in any way; that after the convention met, while we could not possibly undertake to say what that body would see fit to do, we yet hoped and believed that nothing would be done until we had first endeavored, by duly accredited commissioners, to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of all matters, including the delivery of the forts, between South Carolina and the Federal Government. At the same time we again reiterated our solemn belief that any change in the then existing condition of things in Charleston Harbor would, in the excited state of feeling at home, inevitably precipitate a collision.
The impression made upon us was that the President was wavering and had not decided what course he would pursue. He said he was glad to have had this conversation with us, but would prefer that we should give him a written memorandum of the substance of what we had said. This we did on Monday, the 10th. It was in these words:
His Excellency JAMES BUCHANAN,
President of the United States:
In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the action of the convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the State and Federal Government, provided that no re-enforcement shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.
JOHN McQUEEN.
WM. PORCHER MILES.
M.L. BONHAM.
W.W. BOYCE.
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.
WASHINGTON, December 9, 1860.
The President did not like the word "provided" because it looked as if we were binding him while avowing that we had no authority to commit the convention. We told him that we did not so understand it. We were expressing our convictions and belief, predicated upon the maintenance of a certain condition of things, which maintenance was absolutely and entirely in his power. If he minted such condition, then we believed that collision would be avoided until the attempt at a peaceable negotiation had failed. If he did not, then we solemnly assured him that we believed that collision must inevitably and at once be precipitated. He seemed satisfied, and said it was not his intention to send re-enforcements or make any change. We explained to him what we meant by the words "relative military status," as applied to the forts; mentioned the difference between Major Anderson's occupying his then position at Fort Moultrie and throwing himself into Fort Sumter. We stated that the latter step would be equivalent to re-enforcing the garrison and would just as certainly as the sending of fresh troops lead to the result which we both desired to avoid. When we rose to go the President said in substance, "After all, this is a matter of honor among gentlemen. I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary. We understand each other."
One of the delegation, just before leaving the room, remarked: "Mr. President, you have determined to let things remain as they are, and not to send re-enforcements; but suppose that you were hereafter to change your policy for any reason, what then? That would put us, who are willing to use personal influence to prevent any attack upon the forts before commissioners are sent on to Washington, in rather an embracing position." "Then," said the President, "I would first return you, this paper." We do not pretend to give the exact words on either side, but we are sure we give the sense of both.
The above is a full and exact account of what passed between the President and the delegation. The President, in his letter to our commissioners, tries to give the impression that our "understanding" or "agreement" was not a "pledge." We confess we are not sufficiently versed in the wiles of diplomacy to feel the force of this "distinction without a difference." Nor can we understand how, in "a matter of honor among gentlemen," in which "no paper or writing is necessary," the very party who was willing to put it on that high footing can honorably descend to mere verbal criticism to purge himself of what all gentlemen and men of honor must consider a breach of faith. The very fact that we (the Representatives from South Carolina) were not authorized to commit or "pledge" the State, were not treating with the President as accredited ministers with full pours, but as gentlemen, assuming, to a certain extent, the delicate task of undertaking to foreshadow the course and policy of the State, should have made the President the more ready to strengthen our hands to bring about and carry out that course and policy which he professed to have as much at heart as we had. While we were not authorized to say that the Convention would not order the occupation of the forts immediately after secession and prior to the sending on of commissioners, the President as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, could positively say that so long as South Carolina abstained from attacking and seizing the forts, he would not send re-enforcements to them, or allow their relative military status to be changed.
We were acting in the capacity of gentlemen holding certain prominent positions, and anxious to exert such influence as we might possess to effect a peaceful solution of pending political difficulties, and prevent, if possible, the horrors of war. The President was acting in a double capacity-not only as a gentleman, whose influence in carrying out his share of the understanding or agreement was potential, but as the head of the Army, and therefore having the absolute control of the whole matter of re-enforcing or transferring the garrison at Charleston.
But we have dwelt long enough upon this point. Suffice it to say that considering the President as bound in honor, if not by treaty stipulations, not to make any change in the forts or to send re-enforcements to them unless they were attacked,we of the delegation who were elected to the Convention felt equally bound in honor to do everything on our part to prevent any premature collision. This Convention can bear us witness as to whether or not we endeavored honorably to carry out our share of the agreement.
The published debates at the very commencement of the session contain the evidence of our good faith. We trusted the President. We believed his wishes concurred with this policy and that both were directed to avoiding any inauguration of hostilities. We were confirmed in our confidence and reassured in our belief by a significant event which took place subsequent to our interview. He allowed his premier Cabinet officer, an old and tried friend, to resign rather than yield to his solicitations for the re-enforcement of the garrison at Charleston. We urged this as a convincing proof of his firmness and sincerity. But how have we been deceived! The news of Major Anderson's coup produced a sudden and unexpected change in the President's policy. While declaring that his withdrawal from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter was "without orders, and contrary to orders," he yet refused for twelve hours to take any action in the matter. For twelve hours, therefore, without any excuse, he refused to redeem his plighted word. No subsequent acts on the part of our State, no after reasons, can wipe away the stain which he suffered to rest upon his "honor as a gentleman," while this hours, big with portentous events, rolled slowly by. His Secretary of War, impatient of a delay, every moment of which he felt touched his own honor, resigned. He did so solely on the ground that the faith of the Government, solemnly pledged, was broken, if it failed promptly to undo what had been done contrary to its wishes, against its settled policy and in violation of its distinct agreement. The President accepted his resignation without comment. He did not attempt to disabuse the mind of his Secretary as to what was the true position of the Government.
What a spectacle does the President's vacillating and disingenuous course present! He allows one Secretary to resign rather than abandon a policy which he has agreed upon. Scarcely have a few short weeks elapsed, and he accepts the resignation of another rather than adhere to that very policy. He makes an agreement with gentlemen which, while he admits that they have faithfully kept it on their part, he himself evades and repudiates. And this he does rather than redress a wrong, correct an error-what he himself considers an error-committed by a subordinate, without his orders and contrary to his wishes! It was at least due to Mr. Floyd, who, as one of his Cabinet, had officially and personally stood by his administration from its very commencement- through go do report and through evil report-to have explained to him that he was, in the President's opinion, laboring under a misapprehension; at least to have said to him, "You are mistaken about this matter: do not leave me on a false issue." But no; he coldly, ungraciously, yet promptly, receives the resignation without a syllable of remonstrance, and thus tacitly but unequivocally accepts without shame the issue presented. He does not deny that the faith of his Government is pledged, but he deliberately refuses to redeem it.
WM. PORCHER MILES.
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.
(To view this page in its Source Category, click
